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I. INTRODUCTION
URING this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court addressed
the timely waiver of objections to expert testimony and the relia-
bility of expert testimony on damages, considered the signifi-
cance of an in camera review in connection with assertions of attorney-
client privilege, and reviewed the appropriateness of death-penalty sanc-
tions. The appeals courts grappled with the affidavit requirements under
the Medical Liability Insurance Improvement Act and created a conflict
ripe for consideration by the Texas Supreme Court concerning whether
expert witness statements are party opponent admissions.
*Partner, Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** Associate, Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
*** Associate, Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
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II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Once again, the connection between expert testimony and the specific
issues in a case was addressed by the Fifth Circuit during this Survey pe-
riod.1 Also considered was the waiver of an objection to expert testi-
mony, the distinction between actual and merely hypothetical alternative
explanations an expert is required to consider, the admissibility of play
therapy expert testimony, and the adequacy of expert reports under the
Medical Liability Insurance Improvement Act. Although other cases
were reported concerning expert testimony,2 the following had the most
impact.
A. THE FEDERAL DAUBERT CASES
In Vogler v. Blackmore,3 the Fifth Circuit addressed the admissibility of
a thanatologist, or "grief" expert. After the plaintiff's wife and daughter
were killed when a tractor-trailer ran over the roof of their car from front
to back, he brought a wrongful death action against the driver of the trac-
tor-trailer and the driver's employer. At trial, the plaintiff presented an
expert in thanatology, which is the study of the effects of approaching
death and the needs of the terminally ill and their families. Although
highly qualified academically, the expert did not interview or evaluate the
plaintiff, confining her testimony to general theories about grief and re-
covery. The defendants appealed the jury's damage award, contending
that the expert's testimony was not relevant because it was unconnected
to the facts of the case. The court disagreed, noting its 2003 holding in
Bocanegra allowing general expert testimony. 4 The defendants also ar-
gued that the expert's testimony would not have assisted the jury because
grief is a universally experienced emotion that is within the common
sense understanding of jurors and that the admission of such testimony
might unduly influence the jurors with its scientific appearance. The
court acknowledged these dangers were present in the relatively untested
area of grief expert testimony. However, the defendants had not timely
objected to the admission of such testimony, and they had not challenged
the expert's credentials. The trial court thus had discretion to consider
whether the jury was competent to assess the evidence intelligently with-
out expert testimony, whether the evidence had probative weight, and the
1. During the last Survey period, the Fifth Circuit held that an expert could testify
generally about the effects of marijuana on a person's cognitive functions despite a defen-
dant's objection that the expert could not tie the marijuana use to the cause of an accident.
See Bocanegra v. Vicmar Servs., Inc., 320 F.3d 581, 587 (5th Cir. 2003).
2. See, e.g., Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 562-63 (5th
Cir. 2004) (addressing expert testimony on attorneys' fees); Loram Maint. of Way, Inc. v.
lanni, 141 S.W.3d 722, 730 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, pet. filed) (concerning admissibility
of expert testimony on effect of amphetamines); Brookshire Bros., Inc. v. Smith, No. 01-02-
00677-CV, 2004 WL 1064776, at *5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 13, 2004, no pet.
h.) (finding unreliable causation testimony that relied on manufacturer provided data
rather than the expert's actual knowledge).
3. Vogler v. Blackmore, 352 F.3d 150 (5th Cir. 2003).
4. Id. at 155 (citing Bocanegra, 320 F.3d at 587).
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risk of prejudice. 5 Because the expert's testimony was relevant, the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence, even if it
was not necessary, and even if it had, the testimony was harmless because
the jury already knew the tragic facts of the case, had seen photos of the
happy family and the mangled remains of their car, and it was therefore
highly unlikely, that the expert's testimony aided in the jury's resolution
of the case or its awards.
6
B. THE STATE ROBINSON CASES
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the timeliness of a challenge to
expert testimony in Coastal Transport Co., Inc. v. Crown Central Petro-
leum Corp.7 Crown Central sued for negligence and gross negligence af-
ter a Coastal gasoline truck caused a fire that destroyed a Crown Central
gasoline loading facility. The trial court granted Coastal's motion for di-
rected verdict on the issue of gross negligence due to insufficient evi-
dence. Crown Central appealed, arguing that its trucking safety expert
presented evidence of conscious indifference by Coastal when he opined
that Coastal had an actual awareness of risk and nevertheless proceeded
with conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others.
Coastal responded that the expert testimony was conclusory and factually
unsubstantiated and therefore constituted no evidence in support of
Crown Central's gross negligence claim. The appeals court held Coastal
had waived its right to assert that the expert testimony constituted no
evidence because it had not objected to the testimony at trial.8 The Texas
Supreme Court reversed and rendered, holding that an objection to ex-
pert testimony must be timely made only when the objection "requires
the court to evaluate the underlying methodology, technique, or founda-
tional data used by the expert."9 Because Crown Central's expert testi-
mony was conclusory and therefore non-probative on its face, Coastal
had not waived its no evidence challenge despite its failure to object to
the admissibility of the expert's testimony.10
In Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton, the Texas Supreme Court rejected
damages testimony from a petroleum engineer based on the Gammill an-
alytical gap test."1 The plaintiff brought suit against Kerr-McGee for fail-
ure to drill an additional well to prevent drainage and offered the
testimony of an engineer as to the amount of gas a hypothetical well
would have produced. Relying on the engineer's testimony that he based
his projection of the hypothetical well's production on the assumption
5. Id. at 156.
6. Id.
7. 136 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. 2004).
8. Id. at 230-31.
9. Id. at 233.
10. Id.
11. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton, 133 S.W.3d 245, 254 (Tex. 2004) (citing Gammill v.
Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 726 (Tex. 1998) (holding that expert testi-
mony is unreliable if there exists "'too great an analytical gap between the data and the
opinion proffered"') (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)).
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that the hypothetical well would have produced at the same rate as two
existing wells, the trial court awarded damages.12 Because the expert (1)
admitted that the hypothetical well would have a different wall thickness
from the existing wells, which would cause it to produce less; (2) failed to
testify with any specificity how other factors would increase production;
and (3) did not explain how he used the data to reach his opinion, the
court found there was too great an analytical gap between the data and
the conclusions, and the testimony was therefore unreliable and
incompetent. 13
The Fort Worth and San Antonio Courts of Appeals were also fairly
active in 2004 in the area of expert testimony. The Fort Worth Court of
Appeals, in Allstate Texas Lloyds v. Mason, examined whether an expert
must exclude merely hypothetical alterihative explanations. After All-
state determined that damage to the Masons' home was not caused by a
plumbing leak and was thus not covered by their insurance, the Masons
sued Allstate and presented testimony from an engineering expert who
opined that the damage to the house was the result of a plumbing leak.
During a Daubert hearing, the plaintiff's expert conceded that plumbing
pipes could hypothetically break due to soil movement and that he had
not investigated why the pipes had broken in this case. On appeal, All-
state argued that because the expert had not ruled out other possible
causes of damage to the house, his testimony was unreliable and should
not have been admitted. The court rejected this argument because the
expert had testified that he had excluded the possibility that the problems
that had caused previous foundation damage, including soil movement,
were the cause of the damage at issue at trial. He had also testified that
he did not believe that seasonal moisture, which can cause soil move-
ment, caused the damage at issue. Furthermore, Allstate's questions to
the expert were based on hypothetical situations that had not been shown
to be plausible causes of the foundation damage.1 4 The court found that
"there was no evidence presented during the hearing to show that soil
movement was a plausible cause of the foundation problems" or that such
movement could break plumbing pipes.1 5 The trial court, therefore, did
not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony where Allstate had
devised a hypothetical theory at the hearing that it had not shown was
"possible or provable.' 6
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals accepted the expert testimony of a
play therapist in In re A.J.L. 17 In this termination of parental rights case,
the court allowed a play therapist to testify about the play therapy she
had conducted with the child. By "using puppets in a play-acting scena-
12. Id. at 249-50.
13. Id. at 257-58.




17. 136 S.W.3d 293, 296 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet. h.).
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rio," she concluded that the child felt "he needed to protect his baby sis-
ter and that he had been traumatized at home."' 18 The court, considering
testimony that (1) play therapy was "highly regarded" and "a generally
accepted method for counseling children;" (2) "research in the area of
play therapy" showed it was a "successful and effective way to work with
children;" (3) there were no studies challenging the reliability of play
therapy; and (4) it had "been used for decades and [was] widely accepted
in the counseling community," held that play therapy is a legitimate field
of expertise. 19 The court also noted that other courts had accepted play
therapy as a basis for expert testimony.
2 0
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals excluded testimony from a pediatric
ophthalmologist in Gross v. Burt,2 ' finding that it lacked a reliable foun-
dation. In that case, twin boys were born prematurely and were at risk of
retinopathy of prematurity ("ROP"), which can cause vision loss. Babies
at risk of ROP require serial screening and special eye exams to deter-
mine when the disease has reached "threshold." Treatment before
threshold is not effective, but treatment must usually occur within sev-
enty-two hours of threshold to improve the ultimate outcome. Dr. Per-
due, one of the twins' doctors first saw the boys when they were forty-one
and one-half weeks old. She did not initiate a referral to a pediatric oph-
thalmologist until a month later and did not determine that the twins'
external eye exams were abnormal until two months later. By then, the
twins were legally blind. The plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Perdue's negli-
gence proximately caused the twins' blindness. Because the median age
of threshold for ROP is thirty-seven and one-third weeks, Dr. Perdue
claimed that the twins had already reached threshold by the time of their
first visit with her and that her actions did not deprive the twins of more
than a fifty percent chance of a different outcome.
22
The plaintiffs's expert, a pediatric ophthalmologist testifying on causa-
tion, conceded that based on ROP studies, the odds were ninety-five per-
cent or more that the twins had passed threshold before seeing the
doctor. He also agreed that seventy-two hours was the accepted standard
of care for treating ROP after observed threshold, but testified that it was
not proven whether treatment more than seventy-two hours after thresh-
old is effective. He stated that he had treated some patients ninety-six
hours after observing threshold and that they had done as well as the
patients treated within seventy-two hours. However, he admitted that
approximately forty-seven percent of the children who were treated
within the seventy-two-hour window after threshold still became blind.
On appeal, the defendant doctor argued that the expert's opinion that the
twins would still have had a better than fifty percent chance of improve-
ment if the doctor had immediately referred them for treatment was un-
18. Id. at 296.
19. Id. at 299.
20. Id.
21. 149 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. filed).
22. Id. at 230-31.
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reliable.23 The appeals court agreed, pointing out that the expert
acknowledged there were no studies supporting his theory that ROP
"could be treated effectively outside the seventy-two hour window...
because no physician would knowingly withhold treatment upon an ob-
servation of threshold ROP."' 24 Furthermore, in the only study cited in
which treatment did not occur within seventy-two hours of threshold,
none of the patients achieved a positive outcome. The expert's testimony
regarding his own personal experience only supported the conclusion that
treatment within ninety-six hours after observing threshold was effective.
The testimony that the defendant's negligence proximately caused the
twins' injuries was thus unreliable and constituted no evidence of
causation.25
In Wiggs v. All Saints Health System, 26 the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals rejected expert testimony regarding the causation of ischemic optic
neuropathy "(ION") as unreliable. The plaintiff suffered vision loss from
ION following his back surgery and claimed that the negligence of All
Saints Health System and its doctors caused his ION. The trial court ex-
cluded the testimony of two of the plaintiff's experts as scientifically unre-
liable and entered a take-nothing judgment in favor of All Saints and the
doctors. The plaintiff appealed on the grounds that the trial court had
incorrectly applied the Daubert/Robinson factors instead of the Gammill
analytical gap test.27 The appeals court disagreed, stating that although
the trial court had not specified which analysis it had applied, the expert
testimony failed regardless of what standard applied. 28 For example, one
of the experts had never administered anesthesia in a similar case, and
only one of his patients might have had ION. The court concluded that
the expert's lack of personal experience with patients having ION
amounted to "no experience at all:" he had "no special training regarding
ION or its causes," had never treated anyone for ION, had never made a
diagnosis of ION, and had never authored any journal articles on ION. 29
In fact, he had only read two articles on ION, and he did not explain how
they supported his opinion. Moreover, the articles stated that the causes
of ION are unknown in the scientific community and confirmed that post-
surgical vision loss is rare and that many other factors might have impor-
tant contributory roles in the development of post-operative visual
problems. The second expert had only diagnosed forty post-surgery ION
patients since 1970, and had no special training regarding the actual cause
of ION.30 The court stated that while this experience might provide a
basis for him to express an opinion on treating ION, it did not provide a
23. Id.
24. Id. at 240.
25. Id. at 241.
26. 124 S.W.3d 407, 410-11 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).
27. Id. at 416.
28. Id.




reliable basis for him to give an expert opinion on what caused a particu-
lar patient's ION. The court found that neither expert's testimony was
sufficiently reliable to be admissible. 31
The San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's decision to
allow expert testimony regarding the cause of tetanus in Texas Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Lerma.32 Sixty days after Cresencio Lerma punctured
his arm with barbed wire at work, he was admitted to a hospital where he
was diagnosed with tetanus and died shortly thereafter. Lerma's wife
filed a worker's compensation claim, alleging that the barbed wire injury
was the producing cause of his death. Lerma presented expert testimony
that the tetanus infection was a result of the barbed wire incident based
on a study finding that ten percent of tetanus cases developed more than
two weeks from the initial puncture wound. After a jury trial, the trial
court entered judgment for Lerma. The insurer appealed, arguing that
the expert's testimony was unreliable and speculative as to the cause of
Lerma's death. The expert had admitted that he knew of no scientific
evidence indicating that a person could contract tetanus after more than
twenty-one days and that he could not eliminate other ways Lerma might
have contracted tetanus.33 The appeals court found that in light of the
incubation period and the numerous other existing probable causes for
the infection, the expert was unable to prove with reasonable probability
that Lerma contracted tetanus from his barbed wire wound and his con-
clusion was thus an inference of causation "amounting to no more than
conjecture or speculation. '34 Therefore, "the trial court [had] abused its
discretion in admitting his testimony. '35
The San Antonio Court of Appeals also reversed a trial court's deci-
sion allowing expert testimony regarding the cause of tire failure in
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Rios.36 The Rios family pickup truck had
a used tire manufactured by Goodyear. The truck rolled over when the
tire's tread and belt separated from the inner belt, causing the death of
Mr. Rios. Mrs. Rios sued Goodyear and the retailer of the tire, claiming
that the manufacturing defect had prevented the outer belt and inner belt
of the tire from properly bonding. After a jury trial, the trial court ren-
dered judgment against Goodyear. On appeal, Goodyear attacked the
testimony of the plaintiff's two experts. The first expert based his opinion
on observations he made either by touch or sight. He examined the
failed tire and concluded that the tread separation had resulted from a
manufacturing defect. 37 Holding that the testimony was unreliable, the
court noted that there was no "evidence in the record indicating that
other experts in the industry" used the same methodology to determine if
31. Id. at 414.
32. 143 S.W.3d 172 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. filed).
33. Id. at 176-77.
34. Id. at 177.
35. Id. at 178.
36. 143 S.W.3d 107 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. filed).
37. Id. at 113-14.
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a manufacturing defect exists, "as opposed to a defect caused by the use
and abuse of a tire over time," and the expert "did not refer to any article
or publication that specifically supported his approach. '38 The second
expert was a research scientist with educational degrees in chemistry, pol-
ymer science, and engineering. Although his background included re-
search generally into the adhesion properties of various materials, he had
no specific experience with tires. The court stated that while he could
"discuss adhesion failures generally, he was not qualified to opine on the
specifics [of] whether the Rios's tire failed because of an adhesion defect
present at the time of manufacture. 39 He was therefore "not qualified as
an expert in the field of tire failure analysis," and his testimony was "le-
gally insufficient evidence of a manufacturing defect."40
C. EXPERT REPORTS AND AFFIDAVITS
Two courts addressed the adequacy of expert reports under the Medi-
cal Liability Insurance Improvement Act ("Act") during this Survey pe-
riod. The Act, repealed by the Act of June 2, 2003, and recodified as
Texas Practice & Remedies Code Annotated Section 74.351, allows a
party to challenge an expert report by a motion to dismiss if the report
fails to comply with the statutory definition of "expert report."'41 Specifi-
cally, the statute requires that an expert report provide a fair summary of
the expert's opinion "regarding applicable standards of care, the manner
in which the care rendered by the physician or health care provider failed
to meet the standards, and the causal relationship between the failure and
the injury, harm, or damages claimed."'42 Texas courts have struggled
over the last few years in determining whether or not particular expert
reports meet this test. The trend continued this Survey period, with one
court accepting the plaintiff's expert report and the other court rejecting
the plaintiff's report.
In Chandler v. Singh,43 the Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's dismissal of a case in which the plaintiff claimed she was in-
jured in an automobile accident caused by a seizure brought on by Ul-
tram-medication prescribed for her by the defendant. The court
acknowledged that a report must do more than "merely stat[e] the ex-
pert's conclusions about the standard of care, breach, and causation. '44
Rather, the expert report must specifically set out the standard of care,
describe how that care was breached, and must include more than con-
clusory insights concerning causation. Further, the court held that a good
faith effort requires that the report discuss the standard of care, breach,
and causation with enough specificity to inform the defendant of the con-
38. Id. at 115.
39. Id. at 116.
40. Id.
41. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (Vernon 2005).
42. Id.
43. 129 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet. h.).
44. Id. at 188.
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duct the plaintiff has brought into question. 45 However, the plaintiff is
not required to present evidence in the report as if it were actually litigat-
ing the merits, and the report can be informal.46 In Chandler, the first
expert, Dr. Ginsburg, briefly addressed causation, stating "[tihe literature
clearly states that a person with a prior history of seizure activity... is at
an increased risk of having a seizure when taking Ultram. ' 47 The second
expert, Dr. Fischer, expanded on causation, stating:
Taking Tegretol and Ultram lowered [the plaintiff's] threshold for
seizures and she suffered a seizure while driving 5/24/99 resulting in
her motor vehicle accident and subsequent injuries. [Plaintiff] had
been seizure-free for at least six years and stable on her current med-
ication. If a different medication had been prescribed instead of Ul-
tram more likely than not she would not have suffered the seizure
and the resulting accident ....
Five days [after receiving the prescription for Ultram, Plaintiff]...
had a seizure while driving and suffered multiple injuries in a motor
vehicle accident. More likely than not[,] taking Ultram was a direct
and proximate cause of the seizure and a motor vehicle accident.
... It is my medical opinion that the deviation from pharmacy stan-
dards of care as stated by Diane Ginsburg [in her report] was an-
other cause of the damages suffered by Debra Chandler.
48
After reviewing the two expert reports in question, the court of appeals
found that although reference to causation was brief in the first report,
together, the reports were sufficient to put the defendant on notice as to
what actions were being challenged.
49
By contrast, the San Antonio Court of Appeals found in Hutchinson v.
Montemayor,50 that the plaintiff's expert report did not show a good faith
effort in establishing the causation element. The plaintiff, who had a long
history of diabetes and vascular disease, sued after an ulcer on his heel
caused a below-the-knee amputation. The defendants filed a motion to
dismiss, contending that the expert report did not meet the statutory re-
quirements because it was conclusory and based on mere conjecture.
Specifically, the report stated that had a certain medical procedure been
done "there would have been a possibility that [the plaintiff] may have
had bypassable lesions and that the amputation may have been avoided.
Within reasonable medical probability these doctors's [sic] breaches
caused injury to [the plaintiff]." 51 Because the court could not infer from
the expert report that the discovery of bypassable lesions would have pre-
vented the amputation or that the plaintiff's amputation could have been
avoided, the report did not show a good faith effort to comply with the
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 190.
48. Id. at 191.
49. Id.
50. 144 S.W.3d 614, 617 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet. h.).
51. Id. at 617.
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statutory requirements. 52 The court rejected the plaintiff's contention
that the phrase "reasonable medical probability" satisfied the statutory
requirement that the report provide more than speculation or
conjecture. 53
III. PRIVILEGES
The Survey period brought review of numerous privileges, including
the physician-patient, peer-review, and of course, the attorney-client
privilege.
A. PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
In In re Arriola,54 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals addressed the
discovery of medical records and testimony regarding a nursing home pa-
tient. The family and estate of the patient sued Sunnybrook Health Care
Center, alleging sexual assault by another resident. The plaintiffs claimed
that Sunnybrook had knowledge of previous assaults of other Sun-
nybrook staff members and residents by the same resident. Sunnybrook
asserted claims of physician-patient privilege to almost all deposition
questions pertaining to the resident and refused to produce similar docu-
ments.55 Acknowledging an exception to the privilege for abuse and neg-
lect cases, the appeals court conditionally granted a writ of mandamus
requiring the trial court to vacate its protective orders and grant the
plaintiff's motion to compel. 56
The court noted that by contrast to section 242.129 of the Health &
Safety Code, which contains exceptions that only apply to proceedings
brought by law enforcement agencies, the abuse and neglect exceptions
to Texas Rules of Evidence 509 and 510 contain no such limitations and
explicitly state that "they apply to 'any proceeding regarding the abuse or
neglect"' of a resident of a statutorily-defined "institution. ' 57 Although
several provisions of the Health & Safety Code and Human Resources
Code could also prevent a nursing facility from releasing certain medical
information, "each of the confidentiality and privilege provisions cited"
by Sunnybrook contained "an exception to nondisclosure where release
of the information [was] required by law" or court order.58 Because the
rules of evidence required release of the information, the statutes and
rules cited by Sunnybrook did not prevent disclosure. 59 The court ac-
knowledged that it had previously ruled in a factually similar case, In re
Diversicare General Partner, Inc., that various provisions of the Health &
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. No. 13-03-376-CV, 2004 WL 1244289, at *1 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June 3,
2004, orig. proceeding).
55. Id.
56. Id. at *6.
57. Id. at *3.
58. Id. at *4.
59. Id. at *5.
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Safety Code, the Human Resources Code, and the Administrative Code
prohibited disclosure of medical information about an assaulting pa-
tient. 60 However, the parties in that case had not referenced the rules of
evidence, and the court stated that had they done so, the result most
likely would have been different. The appeals court thus overruled
Diversicare to the extent that it was inconsistent with its analysis in
Arriola.61
B. PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE
The Austin Court of Appeals addressed the tension between the Public
Information Act and medical peer review privileges in Capital Senior
Management 1, Inc. v. Texas Department of Human Services.62 The Texas
Department of Human Services ("Department") received a request to
disclose public information about Capital Senior Management 1, Inc.
("Capital"), a nursing home operator. Capital asserted various peer re-
view privileges and a quality of care privilege and sued to enjoin the re-
lease of the documents. The trial court denied Capital's request and
ordered the documents released. The requested documents were com-
piled by the Department for its annual surveys and licensing examina-
tions and its investigations of complaints of abuse or neglect. Some
documents were generated by Capital, and some were generated by the
Department. The documents generated by Capital were titled "Facility
Investigation Reports" and "Facility Abuse/Neglect Investigation Re-
ports" and were used by the Department in their investigations. 6 3 The
appeals court held that these documents were privileged and that the trial
court had erred in ordering their production.64 Pursuant to Texas Health
& Safety Code section 242.127, "reports, records, and working papers
used" or developed by the Department in an investigation of "a com-
plaint of abuse or neglect" are privileged, partially to protect the identity
of the patient and partially to protect the integrity of the investigation
process.65
By contrast, the documents created by the Department were public and
therefore subject to disclosure.66 Capital argued that these documents
fell within various peer review privileges because the documents were re-
viewed by hospital committees and because the Department was an ex-
tension of Capital's peer review committees in that (1) its work fell within
the Committee's quality of care oversight function and (2) Department
investigators were members of Capital's peer review committees. The
court noted that Department representatives were "not agents of the
60. Id. (citing In re Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc., 41 S.W.3d 788 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2001, orig. proceeding)).
61. Id.
62. 132 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. filed).
63. Id. at 73.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 76.
66. Id. at 79.
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nursing home and [were] not for hire."'67 Moreover, public information
cannot be cloaked "in confidentiality by first filtering it through the peer-
review process."'68 Merely because the Department's reports might have
dealt "with the nursing home's quality of care" and might have "been
reviewed by a peer review committee" did not give them a "committee
privilege. '69 Furthermore, chapter 242 of the Health & Safety Code, Ti-
tle 40 of the Administrative Code, and federal law "make all inspection,
survey, or investigation reports public either through the nursing home or
through the Department. '70 The documents here were generated by the
Department and "were not the product of a committee's deliberative pro-
cess," and therefore were not privileged.71
Martinez v. Abbott Laboratories72 reviewed the peer review committee
privilege and the medical committee privilege. In this case, the plaintiff
alleged she was administered morphine through a defective patient-con-
trolled anesthesia pump at the Harris Methodist Fort Worth Hospital.
During discovery, the plaintiff requested documents relating to hospital
investigations of the incident and asked the hospital to describe its inves-
tigations of the incident. The hospital withheld documents and informa-
tion on the basis of peer review privilege and refused to provide
deposition testimony regarding its investigations of the incident. The hos-
pital supported its claims of privilege with affidavits from its Directors of
Risk Management and Continuous Improvement, and it submitted the
documents it claimed were privileged to the trial court for an in camera
review. The trial court held that all but two of the documents were privi-
leged and that the plaintiff could only inquire into whether the hospital
had investigated the incident, "who was involved in the investigation, and
when and where the investigation was conducted. ' 73
After the plaintiff appealed, the court of appeals first examined the
peer review privilege and noted that a "medical peer review committee"
must be a hospital committee that both "operates under the hospital's
written bylaws and is authorized to evaluate the quality of medical and
health care services or the competence of physicians. ' 74 The Risk Man-
agement Director's affidavit stated that Harris's Risk Management Com-
mittee was established pursuant to Harris's bylaws, but was silent on
whether the Committee was authorized to carry out quality reviews.
While the affidavit indicated that the Risk Management Committee di-
rected investigations of identified risk exposure and reports of dissatisfac-
tion, it did not state whether these investigations were performed for the
purpose of quality assessment or for the purpose of financial claims ad-
67. Id. at 78.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 79.
71. Id.
72. 146 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. filed).
73. Id. at 264-65.
74. Id. at 265-66.
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justment. Thus, the hospital did not prove that that committee was enti-
tled to assert the peer review privilege for any investigation documents it
generated. 75 By contrast, the affidavit of Harris's Director of Continuous
Improvement stated that the Quality Review Committee was one of the
committees formed under Harris's bylaws "to review and evaluate the
provision of medical care, including the performance of physicians. '76 It
further explained that the Quality Review Committee could perform a
peer review evaluation of an incident underlying a health care liability
claim and generate a peer review file containing confidential documenta-
tion not kept in the regular course of business. This affidavit was suffi-
cient to establish the peer review privilege, and the records and
determinations of and communications to Harris's Quality Review Com-
mittee were protected by the medical peer review committee privilege.77
The court then addressed the medical committee privilege, which pro-
tects records and proceedings of a "medical committee" unless the
records are made or maintained in the regular course of business by a
hospital. A medical committee is broadly defined and includes any com-
mittee of a hospital. The affidavit of Harris's Risk Management Director
was sufficient to show the Risk Management Committee was a medical
committee of Harris. 78 Its records and proceedings that were not made in
the regular course of business were thus confidential and not subject to
discovery. Here, the incident reports for the plaintiff were marked "Con-
fidential Committee Report" and "Not part of the Medical Record. '79
Because any investigation commissioned by the Risk Management Com-
mittee would have been conducted for the committee's purposes, the doc-
uments and proceedings generated by the investigation would be
protected by the medical committee privilege.8 0
The Beaumont Court of Appeals conditionally granted a petition for
writ of mandamus in part in In re Liberty-Dayton Hospital, Inc.81 The
plaintiffs served requests for admissions asking the Liberty-Dayton Hos-
pital to admit that a hospital administrator and members of the creden-
tialing committee and the peer review committee had received, read, and
reviewed various documents. The plaintiffs also requested various docu-
ments relating to a particular doctor and documents listing or identifying
the members of the hospital's medical staff, peer review committee, and
board of directors.8 2 As to the request for admissions, the appeals court
stated that any communication made to a medical peer review committee
is privileged and deposition questions inquiring about communications to
peer review committees are included in the medical peer review privi-
75. Id. at 266.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 267.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 267-68.
81. 144 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. filed).
82. Id. at 644.
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lege.83 The court found "no reason to distinguish requests for admission
from deposition questions" and held that the trial court had erred in com-
pelling the hospital to respond to plaintiffs' request for admissions.
84
However, the documents sought by the plaintiffs were not created by, or
at the direction of, the peer review committees of the hospital. "Docu-
ments do not become privileged simply by being reviewed or acquired by
a review committee," and there is no prohibition against discovery from
alternative sources. 85 Here, the documents requested did not appear on
their face to be privileged, and they had not been submitted for in camera
inspection. The court therefore could not determine whether mandamus
relief was appropriate, and it directed the trial court to "conduct an ex-
amination of the documents in question to determine" whether any were
discoverable. 86
C. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the importance of an in camera
review once a party makes a prima facie showing of privilege and tenders
documents to the trial court in In re E. I. Dupont DeNemours & Co.87
The defendants produced over 55,000 pages of documents spanning over
sixty years and withheld 607 documents, citing the attorney-client privi-
lege and the work-product privilege. The defendants filed an affidavit
from its paralegal describing the basis of the privilege and tendered the
documents to the trial court for in camera review. The withheld docu-
ments included (1) documents authored or received exclusively by Du-
pont legal representatives; (2) documents authored or received by a
combination of legal and non-legal representatives; and (3) documents
authored or received exclusively by non-legal representatives.
The affidavit specifically described why the first two categories of docu-
ments were privileged but was silent as to the third category. Without
holding an in camera inspection, the trial court held that the first category
of documents was privileged but that the remaining two categories of
documents were not privileged. 88 On mandamus, the Texas Supreme
Court held that once the defendant "makes its prima facie showing of
privilege and tenders documents to the trial court, the trial court must
conduct an in camera inspection" before compelling production. 89 Be-
cause the affidavit was silent as to the third category, the court held that
the defendant failed to meet its prima facie showing and that the trial
court did not error in compelling production of those documents. 90
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed waiver of the attorney-
83. Id.
84. Id. at 644.
85. Id. at 646 (quoting Irving Healthcare Sys. v. Brooks, 972 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. 1996)).
86. Id. at 647.
87. 136 S.W.3d 218 (Tex. 2004).
88. Id. at 221-22.
89. Id. at 223.
90. Id. at 226.
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client privilege in Warrentech Corp. v. Computer Adapter Services, Inc.91
In this breach of contract and fraud case, the primary issue was whether
the trial court abused its discretion by excluding, based on the attorney-
client privilege, a letter that would have shown trial testimony to have
been false. The third-party defendant's president testified that she had
not told anyone who worked at her company to use a false name when
talking to the defendant and that she did not know a specific individual
who worked at Warrantech. To rebut this testimony, the defendant of-
fered a letter that the president had written to her attorney stating that
she did know the individual in question and that an employee had spoken
to the individual using a false name. The third-party defendants objected
to the admission of this letter based on attorney-client privilege, and the
trial court excluded the letter.
The defendant alleged that the third-party defendants had waived their
claim of privilege by failing to assert the privilege over three years after
its production and by failing to assert the privilege within ten days after
the exhibit was identified on the defendant's exhibit list.92 The document
in question was originally identified by the defendant as "an invoice with
attachments"-the identical description given to hundreds of other exhib-
its. 93 The day before trial, the defendant amended their exhibit list to
identify the document as "a letter from the third-party defendant to his
lawyer."'94 The third-party defendant did not assert the privilege until the
exhibit was offered at trial. The trial court held and the court of appeals
affirmed that the defendant did not properly identify the document, and
therefore, privilege was not waived.
The trial court also rejected admission of the document under the
crime-fraud exception. The defendant argued that the exception applied
because the attorney had a duty to disclose the existence of the document
in order to prevent her client from working a fraud upon the court by
providing false testimony. Important to the crime-fraud exception, how-
ever, is that the fraud must have been ongoing or about to be committed
when the document in question was prepared. Here, the document was
prepared long before anyone arguably contemplated providing false testi-
mony during trial.95 Consequently, there was no showing that a fraud
was contemplated upon the court when the letter was written, and there-
fore, the crime-fraud exception was not applicable. 96
Requirements for establishing a prima facie case of work-product privi-
91. 134 S.W.3d 516 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet. h.).
92. "A party who produces material or information without intending to waive a claim
of privilege does not waive that claim.., if within ten days or a shorter time ordered by the
court, after the producing party actually discovers that such production was made-the
producing party amends the response, identifying the material or information produced
and stating the privilege asserted." TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.3 (Vernon 2005).
93. Warrantech, 134 S.W.3d at 525.
94. Id. at 527.
95. Id. at 522.
96. Id. at 528.
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lege were addressed in In re Maher.97 In that case, the insured applied
for his personal injury protection policy limits following a car accident,
but the insurance company denied coverage. The insured sued and filed a
motion to compel after the insurer did not respond to his requests for
production. At the hearing, the insurer claimed that some of the docu-
ments were covered by the work-product privilege. The trial court or-
dered the insurer to provide a privilege log, which it did. The insured
objected to the sufficiency of the log and requested a rehearing on the
motion to compel. At the rehearing, the insurer provided more than 200
pages of withheld documents for an in camera inspection. The insured
again directed the trial court to the inadequacy of the privilege log, but
the trial court denied the motion to compel, and the insured filed a peti-
tion for a writ of mandamus. 98 The appeals court found that the insurer's
privilege log was not adequate because the log provided only general de-
scriptions of documents, stating that various logs, records, and notes were
created "in anticipation of litigation" expected to commence on a certain
date.99 However, the date specified was a year after the accident oc-
curred and a year before suit was filed. With no supporting evidence, the
date did not appear to have any significance to the suit, and a "reasonable
person would not have expected litigation to result" on that date.100 By
"producing over 200 pages of documents without making a prima facie
case" of privilege, the insurer had "required the trial judge to inspect
hundreds of documents." 101 Because the insurer failed to make a prima
facie case of privilege, the burden never shifted to the insured to chal-
lenge the privilege. The trial court therefore abused its discretion by
holding that the documents were privileged. 10 2
D. OTHER PRIVILEGES
In a case of first impression, the El Paso Court of Appeals held in Wil-
Roye Investment Co. II v. Washington Mutual Bank,' °3 that an adverse
inference from a non-party agent's assertion of privilege against self-in-
crimination was permissible in a civil action. In this factually complicated
case, the plaintiff companies re-factored invoices purchased by Key Com-
mercial Investments, Inc.104 Key Commercial was owned and operated
by Steve and Tim Holder. The predecessor of Washington Mutual Bank
recommended the Riley Drilling Company as a client to Key Commer-
cial. Steve Holder later went to work for the parent company of Riley.
Subsequently, Riley and its parent company created false invoices which
97. 143 S.W.3d 907 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, orig. proceeding).
98. Id. at 910-11.




103. 142 S.W.3d 393, 407 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.).
104. Factoring invoices is a practice in which a company sells its invoices for less than
their face value rather than waiting for full payment later.
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they then factored, causing significant financial losses to the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs brought claims against Washington Mutual for fraud, con-
spiracy, and negligence. At trial, the plaintiffs introduced portions of the
deposition testimony of Steve Holder, who had testified as to some sub-
jects, but asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
when asked about the fraudulent invoices. The bank then introduced the
portions of Steve Holder's testimony in which he asserted his privilege.
The bank also introduced Tim Holder's deposition testimony into evi-
dence. The trial court ruled that it would draw an inference from both
Holders' assertions of privilege-that they knew plaintiffs were being
sold fraudulent invoices. The court stated that while Texas Rule of Evi-
dence 513 prohibited the court from drawing an adverse inference against
the plaintiffs as a result of the Holders' invocation of privilege, it did not
prevent the court from drawing inferences against the credibility of the
Holders or their involvement on the issue of causation. The court found
that though the bank had been negligent, plaintiffs' losses were caused by
a criminal and fraudulent scheme and therefore ruled against the plain-
tiffs on all of their claims. 10 5
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that Rule 513(c), which states that an
adverse inference may be drawn in a civil proceeding with respect to a
party's claim of the privilege against self-incrimination, did not apply in
this case because the Holders were not parties to the proceeding. The
bank responded that the Holders were parties for purposes of Rule 513
because they were agents of the plaintiffs. The appellate court looked to
hearsay rules, which allow statements made by certain designated persons
to be admissible against a named party due to the person's relationship to
the party. The court also noted that federal courts had, on a case-by-case
basis, allowed adverse inferences to be drawn where a non-party witness
invokes the privilege. The court concluded that the rationale for allowing
introduction of an agent's admissions against the principal under hearsay
rules also justified the admission of evidence showing that an agent/wit-
ness "has exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege . . .where the ques-
tions substantially relate to a party's claim of defense." 10 6 Here, the
Holders acted as plaintiffs' agents, the questions the bank sought to ask
directly related to its defense, and the plaintiffs would have obtained an
unfair advantage had they been able to present favorable portions of tes-
timony while precluding cross-examination. "Allowing the fact-finder to
draw an adverse inference against [the plaintiffs did not] in any way in-
fringe upon the privilege claimed by the Holders." 10 7 Furthermore, other
evidence at trial established that the Holders had knowledge of or were
involved with the fraudulent invoices. Therefore, if there was any error,
it "did not cause the rendition of an improper judgment. '10 8
105. Id. at 399.
106. Id. at 406-07.




The Texarkana Court of Appeals addressed a federal law on confiden-
tiality of drug treatment programs in In re K.C.P.10 9 In this case, a
mother's parental rights were terminated after the trial court admitted
into evidence the complete record of the results of the mother's therapy
and drug treatment program. The mother argued that the file was pro-
tected and made confidential by 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2, which provides that
the records of the treatment of any patient maintained in connection with
the performance of any program or activity relating to a substance abuse
treatment program are confidential and shall not be disclosed except if
authorized by appropriate court order after application showing good
cause. Here, there was no specific written or oral order finding good
cause to release the documents. The state argued that there was no need
for such an order because (1) the state's need "to ensure the safety and
best interests of the children" must control over any parent's "right to
confidentiality;" (2) the documents were created "as part of a court-insti-
gated plan to assist" the mother; and (3) she "had waived her right to
confidentiality by signing formal waivers. '"110
The appeals court disagreed, rejecting Indiana and Alaska parental ter-
mination cases that held that the interest of the child clearly outweighs
any confidentiality to which a parent is entitled."' The court was unwill-
ing to ignore the plain language of the civil statute, which required an
"application to an appropriate court, showing good cause. 11 2 However,
it found that the trial court was not "statutorily required to enter a writ-
ten or specific oral order." 1 3 Instead, the court was to engage in a bal-
ancing test, and there was no error when a trial court considered
objections and overruled them. The court therefore concluded that the
trial court had "adequately engaged in the requisite balancing test" as
required by statute, and it "did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
documents into evidence. '11 4
IV. SANCTIONS
In Cire v. Cummings," 5 the Texas Supreme Court addressed when a
trial court may strike pleadings without first testing the effectiveness of
lesser sanctions. During pre-trial discovery in this legal malpractice case,
the plaintiff testified she had tape recorded several conversations with
her attorneys, including discussions of settlement negotiations, which was
the subject matter of the malpractice claim. After the plaintiff refused to
produce the tapes, the trial court ordered production and also ordered
counsel to pay $250 in attorney's fees. After an unsuccessful writ of man-
damus, the plaintiff refused to produce the tapes, and the defendants filed
109. 142 S.W.3d 574 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.).
110. Id. at 581-84.
111. Id. at 583-84.
112. Id. at 584.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 585.
115. 134 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2004).
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a motion to strike her pleadings. At the sanctions hearing, the plaintiff
admitted that she had possession of the audio tapes, which were the only
evidence that would support or disprove her claims of misrepresentation,
but her neighbor testified that she had watched the plaintiff burn the au-
dio tapes. The trial court determined that the plaintiff had deliberately
destroyed the tapes to avoid production, and it presumed that these ac-
tions prevented the attorneys from obtaining objective proof that they
were not liable. The trial court granted the attorneys' motion to strike
the pleadings as a sanction, finding that the plaintiff violated four discov-
ery orders, deliberately destroyed and/or concealed material evidence,
and that less stringent sanctions would be ineffective because the plain-
tiff's counsel (1) had never paid the $250 sanction and (2) could not cure
the wrongdoing because the plaintiff had deprived the attorneys of evi-
dence that went to the heart of the proof required to show that her claims
had no merit. The appeals court reversed on the grounds that the trial
court had only issued sanctions once before striking the pleadings, had
failed to consider an alternative lesser sanction such as a spoliation in-
struction, and had not explained why lesser sanctions would not
suffice.1 16
On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court noted that "death penalty sanc-
tions may only be imposed in the first instance when the facts of the case
are exceptional and such a sanction is 'clearly justified.' 1'1 7 While a trial
court is required to consider the availability of lesser sanctions, it need
not test the effectiveness of each lesser sanction by actually first imposing
the lesser sanction.11 8 Here, the trial court had found that Cummings
deliberately destroyed the audio tapes after being ordered to produce
them, and the destruction of the tapes justified a presumption that they
would have disproved her claim. The trial court's order contained an ex-
tensive explanation of the appropriateness of the sanction imposed, dem-
onstrating that the trial court had considered the availability of less
stringent sanctions. Cummings's "egregious conduct" made this an "ex-
ceptional case where it was fully apparent and documented that no lesser
sanctions would promote compliance," and "death penalty sanctions are
clearly justified."' 19 Because this was an exceptional case where the only
objective evidence that would have supported or disproved Cummings's
claims was deliberately destroyed after multiple court orders compelling
its production, the Texas Supreme Court held a harsher sanction than a
mere spoliation instruction was proper.120
The Tyler Court of Appeals addressed the imposition of sanctions in
Hill & Griffith Co. v. Bryant.121 The plaintiffs in that case sued Hill &
Griffith, a seller of silica products, for failing to warn of the dangers of
116. Id. at 838.
117. Id. at 841 (citing Spohn Hosp. v. Mayor, 104 S.W.3d 878, 882 (Tex. 2003)).
118. Id. at 842.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 843.
121. 139 S.W.3d 688 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2004, pet. denied).
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silica. They requested production of all internal memoranda relating to
the marketing of silica-containing products and served interrogatories re-
questing both details about any documents relating to the potential
health hazards of silica-based products and who within the company
would have possession of such documents. The defendants objected to
the interrogatories and requests, and at a hearing on the plaintiffs' mo-
tion to compel, their lawyers represented to the court that every docu-
ment provided to them in response to the discovery requests had been
produced. However, after the court granted the plaintiffs' motion, the
defendants produced three warning labels. Subsequent deposition testi-
mony revealed that there were inter-office documents about other warn-
ing labels. On the morning of pretrial, the plaintiffs filed a motion for
sanctions against the defendants for failure to produce the documents re-
ferred to in the deposition. Later that day, the defendants' counsel deliv-
ered to the plaintiffs an interoffice memorandum that detailed the history
of the warning labels previously produced and the development of warn-
ing labels in response to federal regulations. During the subsequent sanc-
tions hearing, the defendants' lawyer testified that she had made the
decision to withhold the document from plaintiffs after it was sent to her.
She also testified that another lawyer had been responsible for everything
that had taken place at the deposition and the determination of which
documents would be produced at that time. The trial court ordered that
the plaintiffs be allowed to retake and take additional depositions and
that the defendants pay the plaintiffs' fees associated with the deposi-
tions, the motion to compel, and the motion for sanctions. In addition,
the trial court ordered the defendants' lawyer to perform fifty hours of
community service with a legal aid program. The trial court also ordered
counsel to turn over for in camera inspection other documents that had
been withheld during discovery, some of which the trial court subse-
quently ordered to be produced. The plaintiffs then filed a second mo-
tion for sanctions, and the trial court ordered additional depositions at
the defendants' expense. The plaintiffs' counsel submitted documenta-
tion showing that the total expenses pursuant to the sanctions orders to-
taled $17,500.30, which the trial court determined was reasonable. It
entered orders granting the plaintiffs' first and second motions for sanc-
tions, and the defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had abused
its discretion in granting plaintiffs' motions for sanctions. 122
The defendants argued on appeal that the memo on warning labels had
nothing to do with marketing, and therefore, their attorneys had a good
faith basis for withholding the documents from production. The court of
appeals disagreed, stating that the trial court had been explicit that all
information and documentation relating to the potential health hazards
of silica were to be produced. The trial judge had taken an expansive and
liberal view of the plaintiffs' discovery requests, which corresponded with
the views taken by the Texas Supreme Court and the United States Su-
122. Id. at 694, 696.
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preme Court. The defendants also argued that it was their attorneys
alone who had decided that the memo was not responsive and that they
should not have been punished for their counsel's conduct. The court of
appeals found that while the lawyer had stated that she had made the
decision not to turn over the memo, other factors and circumstances
showed that the defendants had played a role in the discovery abuse. For
example, they had withheld the memo from their attorneys for a period
of over eight months, until the court's hearing on the motion to compel,
and they had also hired another lawyer who knew or should have reason-
ably known after the deposition that the memo had been withheld. As an
agent of the defendants, his actions should be attributed to them "when
determining sanctionable costs."' 123 The defendants had also asserted
their attorney-client privilege with regard to communications with their
attorneys regarding the memo. Although Hill & Griffith had a right to
claim the privilege, it showed a "lack of cooperation with the court in
making its determination of whether the" company or its attorneys
"should pay the discovery sanctions.' 1 24 The lawyer also argued that the
court's order for her to perform community service was not a just sanc-
tion. The court disagreed, noting that she herself had stated that she had
made the decision not to produce the memo despite the court's orders.
The court stated that it did not view community service for discovery
abuse with much favor, but other courts had approved such sanctions.
The court further stated that it believed "that the community service
would persuade" her, her law firm, "and other attorneys to be careful not
to take actions contrary to the liberal spirit in which they should view all
discovery requests."' 125
V. MISCELLANEOUS DECISIONS OF NOTE
A. HEARSAY
In Powell v. Vavro, McDonald and Associates, L.L.C.,126 the Dallas
Court of Appeals addressed the business records exception to the hearsay
rule. The defendant travel company filed a motion for summary judg-
ment, arguing no evidence of damages in a fraud case where the plaintiffs
received a full refund of the charge for a travel club membership to their
credit card. The trial court granted summary judgment, and on appeal,
the plaintiffs asserted that the trial court erred in overruling their objec-
tions to summary judgment evidence. The defendant had presented two
affidavits by its customer service manager, who stated that the plaintiffs'
credit card had been credited and that he had personal knowledge of this
information because he had received notice of a chargeback from the
credit card company. The manager also stated that he was the custodian
of records for the travel company and that his affidavit attached to busi-
123. Id. at 696.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 697-98.
126. 136 S.W.3d 762 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet. h.).
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ness records received from the credit card company. 127 The court of ap-
peals held that the trial court had erred in admitting the documents
because the affidavit failed to lay the proper foundation for the credit
card documents. 128 The manager "was not a qualified witness to testify
about the recordkeeping of" the credit card company for which he was
not an employee, and the documents were therefore inadmissible. 129
The Texas Supreme Court reversed a trial court's decision to admit
hundreds of consumer complaints in a products liability case in Nissan
Motor Co. v. Armstrong.130 In that case, the plaintiff sued Nissan after
she was in an accident caused by unintended acceleration, which resulted
both in broken bones in her foot and nerve damage. The National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") had previously received a
number of complaints of unintended acceleration in the 280ZX and
300ZX cars. After an investigation, it concluded that there was no prob-
lem with the car and that the acceleration was likely caused by driver
error. In response to this finding, Nissan recalled some models to install a
system that required drivers to step on the brake before shifting out of
park. The trial court admitted evidence from Nissan's database of the 757
consumer complaints, notwithstanding objections based on hearsay and
relevance. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the appeals
court affirmed. 3 1
The appeals court upheld the admission of the database, holding that
(1) the accidents complained of had occurred under reasonably similar
circumstances; (2) the sheer number and nature of the accidents raised an
inference that the unintended acceleration was caused by something
other than driver error; (3) Nissan had waived any objection to the admis-
sion of the other accidents; and (4) the database was relevant to show
Nissan's knowledge of the dangerous condition of its vehicles. The Texas
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, noting that evidence of similar
accidents is admissible only if the other incidents have occurred under
reasonably similar conditions and do not cause undue prejudice, confu-
sion, or delay. 132 "Prolonged proof of what happened in other accidents
may not be used to distract a jury's attention from what happened in the
case at hand."'1 33 The court noted that unintended acceleration can have
many causes, and competent evidence of a specific defect is required. 3 4
Although the plaintiff alleged that the unintended acceleration was
caused by a defective throttle cable, none of the complaints Nissan re-
ceived concerned the throttle cable. In fact, over 200 of the complaints
involved cars that did not even have the allegedly defective throttle
127. Id. at 765.
128. Id. at 765.
129. Id.
130. 145 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. 2004).
131. Id. at 134-36.
132. Id. at 138.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 141.
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mechanism. Therefore, there was nothing in Nissan's database of con-
sumer complaints to suggest that the defect, if any, causing the complaints
was similar to any of the defects alleged by Armstrong. Additionally, the
sheer number of the reported incidents raised no inference that the unin-
tended acceleration was caused by something other than driver error, just
as the number of automobile accidents in America raises no inference
that most have nothing to do with drivers' mistakes. Finally, the Texas
Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals's ruling that the "database
was relevant to show Nissan's knowledge of the dangerous condition of
its vehicles. '135 The Court dismissed the appeals court's reasoning as be-
ing circular because the hearsay was not admissible for the truth of the
matter asserted but was admissible to show Nissan's knowledge of the
truth of the matter asserted. 136
The Houston Court of Appeals raised a conflict with the Beaumont
Court of Appeals with its decision in McCluskey v. Randall's Food Mar-
kets, Inc.,137 regarding whether testimony of an opposing party's expert is
an admission by a party opponent. The plaintiff, Robert McCluskey, was
prescribed a drug by a doctor who was unaware that McCluskey had
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. McCluskey filled the prescription
at Randall's Food Market Pharmacy and died a few hours later of cardiac
arrest. Randall's designated an expert witness to bolster its claims against
the doctor who had prescribed McCluskey's medication. After McClus-
key non-suited the doctor, Randall's decided that it no longer needed Dr.
Thornton's expertise or testimony. McCluskey then attempted to intro-
duce the expert's deposition under the theory that it constituted the ad-
mission of a party opponent. 138 The trial court excluded the testimony,
and the Houston Court of Appeals affirmed, disagreeing with a Beau-
mont Court of Appeals' decision, holding that a conclusion of an expert
witness hired by an opposing party is admissible against the party oppo-
nent.139 The Houston court stated that to treat all statements made by an
expert witness as admissions of the designating party would misconstrue
the rules of evidence, the law of agency, and the purpose of calling expert
witnesses. 140 While an expert witness is hired by one party to testify on
that party's behalf, rarely will an expert agree to be under the party's
control with respect to his or her testimony. The rules of evidence re-
quire that the expert testify to his own opinion in his particular field of
expertise. The opinion is to be impartial and cannot be imputed to the
party who called the expert to testify. Indeed, there may be instances
where a party disagrees with the testimony of its own expert. Therefore,
135. Id. at 141-42.
136. Id.
137. No. 14-03-01087-CV, 2004 WL 2340278, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
Oct. 19, 2004, no pet. h.).
138. Id. at *3.
139. Id. at *9 (citing Yarbrough's Dirt Pit, Inc. v. Turner, 65 S.W.3d 210, 214 (Tex.




the testimony of an expert witness "should not, ipso facto, be deemed an
admission of the party who originally sought the expert's opinion."'141
The court noted that, of course, an opinion may sometimes be admissible
if the expert actually is an agent or employee of the party opponent. 142
The Texarkana Court of Appeals addressed the exception to the hear-
say rule for statements by a party's agent concerning a matter within the
scope of the agency or employment made during the existence of the rela-
tionship in Tucker's Beverages, Inc. v. Fopay.14 3 Twenty minutes before
his scheduled work shift was to begin, a Tucker's employee, Moore, drove
across a highway, striking another vehicle. The employee acknowledged
his fault, but his employer disputed its vicarious liability under respondeat
superior. The jury concluded that the attempted highway crossing was
within the course and scope of employment and found for the plaintiffs.
On appeal, Tucker's contended that the trial court erred in admitting
post-accident statements attributed to the employee by other witnesses.
Specifically, the witnesses testified that immediately after the accident,
the employee said that he had been transporting merchandise between
Tucker's stores and picking up night deposits for Tucker's. These state-
ments were the only non-circumstantial evidence of course and scope.144
The appeals court stated that because it was "undisputed that [the driver]
was Tucker's employee on the day of the accident, the trial court needed
to determine only whether [his] statements concerned a matter within the
scope of his employment. ' 145 "It [was] irrelevant to the admissibility
question whether [he] was on duty at the time of the accident.' 46 There-
fore, there was "no error in the trial court's determination that Moore's
statements were admissions by a party-opponent" and fell within an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule. 147
B. ADR CONFIDENTIALITY
In Alford v. Bryant,148 the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed the limits
of confidentiality under the alternative dispute resolution statutes in the
context of the "offensive use" exception. Le Earl Bryant hired attorney
Alford to represent her in litigation against a roofing contractor. The suit
settled at mediation, and the parties entered into an agreement settling
all claims between Bryant and the roofing contractor except for attor-
ney's fees and recoverable costs of litigation, which were left to the trial
court. The trial court decided that each party was to bear its own costs
and attorney's fees. Subsequently, Bryant sued Alford for legal malprac-
tice, alleging that Alford had failed "to disclose the risks and benefits of
141. Id. at *4.
142. Id.
143. 145 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet. h.).
144. Id. at 767.
145. Id. at 768.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 137 S.W.3d 916, 918-19 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. filed).
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settlement, including the fact that the trial court had the power to deny"
Bryant's claim for attorney's fees.149
Alford maintained that she had disclosed the risk that the trial court
might not award attorney's fees, but that the only people who heard this
disclosure were herself, Bryant, and the mediator. At trial, Alford at-
tempted to call the mediator to testify about the disclosure, but the trial
court did not allow the mediator to testify on the basis of Texas's alterna-
tive dispute resolution statutes. On appeal, the court stated that
"[a]lthough the mediation confidentiality statutes have not been accorded
the status" of a privilege by case law, it would look to other situations in
which privileges were held not to be absolute. 150 "[A] statutory privilege
may be waived by the holder of the privilege" where the holder seeks to
"invoke the jurisdiction of the courts in search of affirmative relief" but
on the basis of privilege denies the opposing party "the benefit of evi-
dence that would materially weaken or defeat the claims. '151
The court found that policy supported the "disclosure of the confiden-
tial communications at issue."'1 52 Significant substantive and procedural
rights of the attorney were implicated, including her opportunity to de-
velop evidence of her defense to the claim of malpractice and to submit
contested fact issues to the fact finder. Furthermore, since Bryant was
seeking to assert a new and independent cause of action, Alford's defense
would not disturb the settlement in the underlying action. The court con-
claded that since "the mediation confidentiality statutes and the attorney-
client privilege are grounded upon similar policy rationales, including ef-
fective legal services and administration of justice, the offensive use doc-
trine" that applies to the attorney-client privilege should also apply to the
mediation confidentiality statutes.153 The court therefore applied the test
for offensive use. It found that "Bryant sought affirmative relief in the
form of a money judgment;" the information sought was likely to be "out-
come-determinative" since "only Alford, Bryant, and the mediator were
present;" and the testimony of the mediator would not be cumulative as it
was the only evidence available to the fact finder other than the word of
Bryant and Alford.' 54 The court found that Bryant had waived the privi-
lege and therefore reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the
case for further proceedings.1 55
C. OPTIONAL COMPLETENESS
In Crosby v. Minyard Food Stores, Inc.,156 the court addressed the ap-
plicability of the rule of optional completeness in the context of a slip and
149. Id. at 918-19.
150. Id. at 921.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 922.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 923.
156. 122 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet. h.).
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fall case in which the defendant's expert physician's affidavit was admit-
ted after the plaintiff's expert addressed many of the opinions set forth in
the affidavit. Although the plaintiff's expert challenged the credibility of
the defendant's expert and refuted the opinions therein, the Dallas Court
of Appeals held that the affidavit was hearsay and should not have been
admitted under the rule of optional completeness. 157 Specifically, the
court noted that application of the rule first requires a showing that
"some portion of the matter sought to be 'completed' [was] actually...
introduced into evidence. '1 58 "Second, the party seeking to complete the
matter must show that the remainder being offered" is on the same sub-
ject "and is necessary to fully understand or explain the matter. ' 159 'Fo-
cusing on the second requirement, the court held that the defendant
failed to show "why it was necessary to admit the affidavit to explain or
understand the portions referred to" by the plaintiff's expert. 160 How-
ever, because the affidavit was directly challenged by the plaintiff's expert
and because the defendant's expert did not testify and therefore had no
opportunity to dispute the plaintiff's expert's statements, the court ulti-
mately found that although admission of the affidavit was error, the error
was not harmful.' 6 '
D. JUDICIAL NOTICE AND ADMISSION
The Dallas Court of Appeals addressed the importance of specifically
identifying the discrete facts for which a party seeks judicial notice in
Longtin v. Country One Stop, Inc.' 62 In this case, the plaintiff merely
requested that the trial court take judicial notice of a prior temporary
injunction hearing that had not been transcribed. Because no particular
testimony or reporter's record was identified by the plaintiff, the court of
appeals held that the trial court did not err in failing to take judicial
notice.' 63
The Texas Supreme Court addressed judicial admissions in PPG Indus-
tries, Inc. v. JMB/Houston Centers Partners Limited Partnership-a case
that is more significant for its holding that DTPA claims cannot be as-
signed by a building owner to a building purchaser. 64 In that case, the
plaintiff building purchaser brought a DTPA action after the original
owner assigned its warranty claims to the purchaser as part of the sale,
and the window manufacturer and installer refused to replace or repair
defective windows in the building. The plaintiff argued that the defend-
ants judicially admitted that the discovery rule tolled limitations on all of
the warranty claims until the date the defendant refused to repair or re-




161. Id. at 904.
162. 129 S.W.3d 632 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet. h.).
163. Id. at 634-36.
164. 146 S.W.3d 79, 82 (Tex. 2004).
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place defective windows by failing to object to a jury charge instruction
that so-stated the same. The court disagreed, noting that a judicial admis-
sion "must be a clear, deliberate, and unequivocal statement," and al-
though "a party's failure to object at trial may constitute waiver," it does
not constitute a judicial admission.165
E. PAROL EVIDENCE
Two cases addressed parol evidence during this Survey period-one
admitting parol evidence and the other not. In the first case, Wilson &
Wilson Tax Services, Inc. v. Mohammed,166 investors brought a breach of
contract and fraud action against an investment banker and accountant,
and the trial court granted the investors' motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict after the jury returned a verdict for the defendants.
The trial court permitted parol evidence to complete an ambiguous con-
tract that was silent as to the date of performance. The parol evidence in
question indicated that payments on the contract were due once the in-
vestment account was funded, and because the investment account was
never funded, payment was never due. The Houston Court of Appeals
agreed, noting that where "parties to a written agreement agree orally" to
a condition precedent, "the agreement is not integrated with respect to
the oral condition."1
6 7
The Wilson case is consistent with another Houston Court of Appeals
case, Atlantic Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Butler, which clarified that parol
evidence may not be used to alter or contradict any part of a written
contract. Rather, parol evidence may only be used to remove ambiguity
and to make a contract complete in its terms which show to be incom-
plete.1 68 In Atlantic Lloyds, the plaintiffs appealed a summary judgment
order finding that the settlement agreement in question required pay-
ment of a specific amount rather than exhaustion of the insurance policy.
Despite correspondence leading up to the written settlement agreement
and an alleged oral agreement indicating that the parties intended to set-
tle for the remainder of the insurance policy, the court of appeals af-
firmed, holding that the settlement agreement was not ambiguous and
parol evidence could not be used to materially alter or contradict the ex-
press and unambiguous terms of the settlement agreement.
1 69
165. Id. at 95.
166. 131 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
167. Id. at 238.
168. At. Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Butler, 137 S.W.3d 199, 211 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2004, no pet. h.).
169. Id. at 212.
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